All Nest products with relevant OSS licensed code can be found in that device’s specific manifest here. The Nest team has since migrated to utilizing GoogleSource Git repositories instead of Google Drive tarball releases. Inquiring with Google ultimately led to the legally-required GPL license releases of kernel/modules/u-boot source code. So, of course we had to purchase a few to see if we could support it in LineageOS like we do sabrina. This decision was likely made to hit a specific price point and unlike SM1 series chips, the S4 series supports AV1 hardware decoding. Sabrina utilized a high-end Amlogic S905D3G (SM1 family) chipset, while boreal utilizes a much lower end, but much newer Amlogic S805X2G (S4 family) chipset. Given that the names of these devices are so similar, we’ll refer to them by their internal codenames, with the 4K model being “sabrina” and the 1080P model being “boreal”. In September of 2022, Google released a “Full HD” (1080p) model of Chromecast with Google TV, rebranding the original CCwGTV as the Chromecast with Google TV 4K. In 2021, Jan Altensen and I released a persistent secure-boot bypass ( sabrina-unlock) for the original CCwGTV (Chromecast with Google TV). Background: The Original and Next-Generation Secure-Boot Bypass Standard Disclaimer: Any potential damage to your device by this exploit is not the responsibility of the authors of this paper. These vulnerabilities exist in Chromecast with Google TV (1080P) devices not yet updated to the December 2023 build. These products include Android TVs, IP cameras, WIFI APs, routers, smart TVs, automotive components, smart speakers, and more. In fact, any smart product with an Amlogic chip is affected. Some of these vulnerabilities appear to affect multiple Nest devices, including Google Chromecast, Nest Wi-Fi Pro, and some Google Home series products. Keyloggers could record all input, including passwords, presenting a significant threat to user privacy and security. With control over the remote, an attacker could intercept communications by exploiting the always-connected nature of the remote.īeyond audio interception, the risk extends to capturing login credentials for various applications. It is possible that the Chromecast could initiate the microphone remotely, posing a privacy risk. By utilizing the vulnerabilities discussed in this blog, an attacker could pre-install malware or spyware while the device falsely reports as secure to the user while actively eavesdropping on their communications.Īnother concern involves the remote control that remains paired with the device, equipped with a built-in microphone. Nevertheless, it’s important to note that even with well-secured devices, there are potential vulnerabilities. Many TV boxes circulating in these markets have been found to be intentionally pre-infected with malware, as highlighted in various videos that have recently been posted on YouTube.įor those seeking a secure option, the Chromecast is generally considered a safer choice. However, to the average end user who doesn’t customize their device extensively, the primary concern lies in potential pre-installed malware or spyware affecting the device.Įspecially when purchasing from third-party resellers, such as eBay, where these products often undergo frequent resale due to flash sales, caution is advised. For hobbyists, the option to install a custom operating system is now available. Regarding the impact itself, it’s important to consider it from different perspectives. Security researchers Jan Altensen, Ray Volpe, and I developed this chain of vulnerabilities as a group effort. This piece details the development of a chain of three exploits intended to allow an individual to run a custom OS/unsigned code on the Chromecast with Google (CCwGTV) 1080P. Executing a Chromecast Exploit – Times Three Chromecast with Google TV (1080P) Secure-Boot Bypass Introduction: Implications of These Findings
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